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Even Less: Antinomies and Aesthetic Anorexia in the 
Magnetic Fields’ 69 Love Songs (An Album for Boys 
and Girls)1
 
  
A. Kiarina Kordela  
Macalester College  
 
Even less
a little glimpse of nothingness
sucking meaning from the
rest of this mess
 
The Magnetic Fields2  
 
In anorexia nervosa, what the child eats is the nothing.  
Jacques Lacan3  
  
This paper is motivated by a paradox in the reception of the Magnetic Fields’ 
three-volume album, 69 Love Songs.4 In a class in which we discussed this 
album, a group of students maintained that this is a great collection of songs 
to listen to after the break-up of an amorous relation because it entirely 
deconstructs love and shows its absurdity. Another group of students 
emphatically disagreed, arguing that it would be too painful to listen to these 
songs because their overall assertion is that one can find happiness only in 
the plenitude of love. Do the 69 Love Songs deconstruct or reaffirm love? 
1 
  
The question seems to have already bothered others. In the year of the 
album's release, Rob Tannenbaum reports, with postmodern impartiality: 
'Merritt and three other singers celebrate or condemn romance in its myriad 
guises, from boy-girl to less common permutations, bending gender roles 
with cantankerous glee.' I do not think, however, that either our class's 
exclusive disjunction (either a celebration or a condemnation of love) or 
Tannenbaum's inclusive pluralism (some songs celebrate and others 
condemn) justify his conclusion that 'even reasonably smart audiences don't 
know what to make of Merritt and his music.'5
2 
  
The Dynamic Songs  
  
An inexorable tension between impossibility and necessity seems to 
stigmatise love throughout the 69 Love Songs. Already the very first line of 
the three-volume concept-album warns: 'Don't fall in love with me yet.' You 
3 
 
are initially misled to hear in this imperative the exigencies of a matured 
caution against haste: 'We only recently met.' But the song continues: 'True 
I'm in love with you', yet for all that, 'you might decide I'm nut', and if you 
'give me a week or two to / go absolutely cuckoo', then you will 'see your 
error' and 'flee in terror / like everybody else does.' The amorous affair is 
introduced as doomed to fail in the progress of time. A fortiori, you must not 
fall in love with me precisely because the affair must fail, for 'I'm easy to get 
rid of / but not if you fall in love', in which case you are likely not to flee away. 
'If you make' this 'mistake' of falling in love with me, 'my heart will certainly 
break' and 'I'll have to jump in a lake', but if you do not fall in love with me, 
'like everybody else does', I (and you) can perpetuate the recurrence of the 
failure of the love affair ('Absolutely Cuckoo', vol. 1). And in doing so, we 
reconfirm love's absolute power. For if I implore you not to fall in love with 
me it's not because love does not have a grip on me, but, quite the contrary, 
because love has the power of making me 'jump in a lake.' Love triumphs as 
absolute and omnipotent transcendental necessity only as long as the 
empirical amorous affair is doomed to fail. 
  
This split between transcendental concept—Love as necessary and 
invincible Law or Force—and empirical amorous affair—the experience of 
invariably failed love affairs in the subject's history—constitutes a prominent 
epistemological leitmotif in the 69 Love Songs, determining those songs 
which I call, for reasons that will become clear below, the dynamic set of 
songs.  
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In this set, 'I could make you fly away / but I could never make you stay' ('All 
My Little Words', vol. 1). The Law of Love can be upheld only through the 
empirical loss of the beloved—'I don't want to get over you / cause I don't 
want to get over love' ('I Don't Want To Get Over You', vol. 1)—or, what 
amounts to the same, through unrequited love—'love you, obviously, /like 
you really care' ('How Fucking Romantic', vol. 1); 'I made you mine, or so it 
seemed… /You never will love me at all… / You're dreaming of / the corpse 
you really love' ('The One You Really Love', vol. 1). Not excluded from this 
empirical pain is the merciless cruelty break-ups or divorces may involve, as 
in the arguably exemplary dynamic song, 'Yeah! Oh, Yeah!' (vol. 3). One 
way or another, 'my only love has' always 'gone away', 'my heart' is 'gone', 
and 'life goes on' only as my 'death goes on' ('My Only Friend' and 'Epitaph 
for My Heart', vol. 2). Like a zombie, 'bitter tears keep me going / through the 
years', until 'all the world', including 'moon', 'stars', and 'the dead in their 
graves / and the gods in their caves' are 'singing the blues' ('Bitter Tears' and 
'Blue You', vol. 3). In the dynamic songs, the truly inseparable lovers seem 
to be love and death themselves, their amorous affair alone being both 
necessary and possible. 
5 
  
Conversely, just as the empirical impossibility of the affair guarantees the 
transcendental Law of Love, the necessity of Love guarantees the law of the 
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impossibility of the affair. This is the relation between transcendence and 
experience, the sole characters in the dynamic set of songs whose love is 
both necessary and possible. The theme is old but far from exhausted. What 
is the effect of coupling not human lovers but love and death, as the stand-
ins for transcendence and experience, in the only embrace that can endure? 
I suggest that we can approach this question by following a Spinozian-
Kantian-Lacanian line of thought.6
  
The Magnetic Fields, or at least Stephin Merritt, who, in his own words, 
'thought of the idea' of the 69 Love Songs, shared the fundamental concern 
underlying Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Merritt wrote not just one or even 
'40 love songs', which 'would be silly', but 'Sixty-nine', which, beyond its 
'obvious relation to romance' and 'graphic possibilities', is 'grandiose'; it was 
in fact only because of practical reasons that he did not write '100', as they 
'would be 200 minutes long which is hours and hours'.7 Whether one sets 
out to make 100 or 69 love songs, the intention obviously is not to speak 
about one historically contingent case of a love affair, but to make a 
comprehensive statement about love, to approach love universally and as a 
totality. This intention is reconfirmed also by the musical ambitions of the 
album which undertakes an indefatigable journey in the history of music that 
passes through, and often combines within an individual song, periods, 
genres and styles, such as: a cappella, blues, jazz, 1960s beat jazz poetry, 
jazzy Lieder and bebop, bubble-gum pop, choral pop, summery pop and 
sentimental pop, old cowboy ballads, rock ’n’ roll ballads, rock ballads and 
1980s pop ballads, slow dance (e.g., in the Phil Collins tradition), Irish folky 
tunes, cosmic background, space rock, drone music and shoegaze, dirges, 
piano-bar solo songs, epic show tunes (Broadway or Tom Jones type), 
Africa, Caribbean music, cheer songs, hippy protest songs, disco, new 
wave, country, serenades, apocalyptic music, punk, balalaika songs, post-
WWII chansons, duets, lullabies and children songs, carnival or circus 
music, blue grass, waltz and sentimental melodies—a list that is far from 
exhaustive—as well as playing styles that range from acoustic to 1970s 
strumming guitar and everything in-between or thereafter.8 On the musical 
level, too, the 69 Love Songs aspire to reach the limits of experience and 
cover its totality, in this case, the totality of the history of twentieth-century 
Western music, which, of course, has in itself already incorporated and 
appropriated to its own ends a long musical tradition since the Middle Ages 
and the Renaissance, as well as non Western music, notably in this case 
African. In short, in the enterprise of the 69 Love Songs, Merritt and his 
collaborators shared the same ambition as Immanuel Kant, whose 
'transcendental critique' aimed at nothing less than approaching a subject—
in his case, the world or all possible experience—as a totality. The album 
literally belongs to the 'transcendental', not the 'dumb', part of 'The Book of 
Love' (vol. 1). 
7 
  
But, as Kant admonishes us, the first obstacle in speaking of 'absolute 8 
 
totality', be it that 'of all possible experience' or of all possible love 
experience, lies in the fact that 'absolute totality […] is itself not experience' 
but a 'transcendent' thing, a pure concept of reason, and not something that 
one can actually experience.9 I may be able to entertain in the abstract the 
concept of all possible configurations of love, but I cannot actually 
experience them. But even the abstract contemplation stumbles against 
obstacles. For the second impediment emerges from reason's failure to 
constitute the 'totality' of 'all possible experience', of 'love', or what have you. 
To explicate this point, Kant offers the following example of what he calls the 
dynamic antinomy of pure reason. Regarding the cause of everything in the 
world, reason can prove two contradictory statements as true: the thesis that 
beyond the 'laws of nature […] there is also […] freedom', and the antithesis 
that 'there is no freedom' but only 'laws of nature.'10 After extensively proving 
as true both freedom and determinism, Kant proceeds to argue that reason 
nevertheless does not fall into an antinomy here, for 'if natural necessity is 
merely referred to appearances'—the realm of experience—'and freedom 
merely to things in themselves'—the realm of transcendence—then, 'no 
contradiction arises if we  […] admit both kinds of causality […] to one and 
the very same thing, but in different relations—on one side as an 
appearance, on the other as a thing-in-itself.'11 Reason does not fall into an 
antinomy as long as the exception of the transcendent free thing-in-itself 
guarantees the subjection of the totality of experience to the law, and vice 
versa. In other words, in the case of the dynamic antinomy, reason manages 
to form a whole or a totality (deterministic experience), but only by positing 
an exception (free thing-in-itself) to that totality. 
  
Cast in terms more directly relevant to 69 Love Songs, 'one and the very 
same thing', human action, can 'on one side as an appearance' within 
empirical reality be determined by the law of a repetition compulsion to fail in 
the amorous endeavour, while, 'on the other [side] as a thing-in-itself', in the 
realm of transcendence, it can be free of this law and instead be caused 
purely by the Force of Love. While love is the transcendental cause of 
human action, in their empirical reality humans are governed by the 
compulsion to fail in their love affairs. The empirical law of the repetitive 
amorous failure is sustained by the transcendental Law of Love as the 
ultimate cause of human action, and, conversely, the compulsive repetition 
of the amorous failure sustains Love as the transcendental Law of human 
action. Reason fails in this set of songs in 69 Love Songs in the mode of the 
dynamic antinomy—hence the set's name. 
9 
  
And in failing in this way, these songs grasp the relation between the two 
cardinal causes of human action, as conceived in Freudian/Lacanian 
psychoanalysis: the pleasure principle and the death drive (the latter being 
another word for repetition compulsion).12 As Deleuze has succinctly 
clarified, contrary to a common misunderstanding, the death drive is not the 
exception to the pleasure principle, but its transcendental precondition: 
10
 
  
What we call a principle or law is […] that which governs a particular 
field; it is in this sense that we speak of an empirical principle or a law. 
Thus we say that the pleasure principle governs life universally 
without exception. But […] there must be a principle of another kind, a 
second-order principle, which accounts for the necessary compliance 
of the field with the empirical principle. It is this second-order principle 
[the death drive] that we call transcendental.13
 
  
While subjects are empirically (consciously) motivated to act by their search 
for pleasure, it is another, second-order or transcendental (unconscious) 
principle, the death drive, that determines their actions to be governed by the 
pleasure principle. 
 
  
The ingenuity of the universe of the dynamic set of the 69 Love Songs lies, 
however, in an apparent inversion regarding the domains of the death drive 
and the pleasure principle, according to which the latter governs 
transcendence while empirical life is dominated by the death drive: if affairs 
fail empirically it is because they succumb to the death drive so that Love 
and its pleasures can triumph transcendentally. 
11
  
Although fully aware of the invincible Force and bliss of love, the 'characters' 
of the songs do not ever let themselves experience it, for the unshakable 
belief in the dynamic songs is that love’s joy is empirically impossible, a 
hypothesis of an always unrealisable possibility. These songs advance, 
therefore, the properly psychoanalytic thesis that the unconscious—the Real 
of one's desire—is on the side of knowledge, not on that of belief. As Slavoj 
Žižek writes regarding the question, 'where…does the desire reside': 
'contrary to the obvious answer (in the belief—'I know that X will take place, 
but I refuse to believe it since it runs against my desire…'), the Lacanian 
answer […] is […]: in the knowledge.' To exemplify his point, Žižek turns to a 
filmic example, Arbogast's murder in Alfred Hitchcock's Psycho (1960). In 
Žižek's words: 
12
  
the greatest surprise is caused by the complete fulfillment of our 
expectations…'I know very well that X will take place (that Arbogast 
will be murdered), yet I do not fully believe it (so I'm none the less 
surprised when the murder actually takes place).'…as viewers of 
Psycho, we desire the death of Arbogast, and the function of our 
belief that Arbogast will not be attacked by the 'mother'-figure is 
precisely to enable us to avoid the confrontation with the Real of our 
desire.14
 
  
What we know and desire—the Real of our desire—is Arbogast's murder; 
yet our defence against confronting the Real of our desire, the mechanism 
through which we repress this desire so that we are not conscious of it, is 
 
 
enabled by our conscious belief that Arbogast will not be attacked, and, at 
the end, we are surprised by seeing fulfilled what we always already have 
unconsciously known. 
  
By the same token, the 'horrifying reality' that the dynamic songs refuse to 
'believe in' and to 'integrate into [their] symbolic universe' (to sing) is the 
triumph of love within the realm of experience, the fact that the empirical 
amorous affair could be successful, as it used to be represented, say, in just 
about every romantic Hollywood film in the 1950s. The postmodern postulate 
regarding love manifests itself here as the inversion of the standard classical 
happy ending, whereby the logic becomes: 'I know very well [on a 
transcendental level] that my love affair will fail, yet [empirically or practically] 
I do not fully believe it, so that, on the one hand, I act as if it would not fail 
(i.e., I do engage in love affairs), and, on the other, I am taken by surprise 
when it actually fails.' Except that now this well-known modernist fetishistic 
logic is adulterated by the further postmodern knowledge that 'You and me, 
we don't believe /in happy endings'—i.e., a second-order belief beyond the 
one (in the happy ending or the non-failure of the affair) allowing us to 
defend ourselves against our knowledge (that it will fail), and which (second-
order or transcendental belief) thus overlaps entirely with our 
(transcendental) knowledge (that the affair will fail) ('My Only Friend', vol. 2). 
There is no longer a distance or discrepancy between knowledge and belief. 
Which is why postmodern subjectivity enters the love affair, and this without 
the remotest sense of guilt, not with unmitigated passion but with calculating 
caution.15
13
  
The dynamic songs are an artistic representation of the formal matrix 
underlying the postmodern configuration of knowledge and belief regarding 
love. By sustaining Love as a transcendental Necessity in the midst of 
postmodern discourse, these songs reveal that love is the repressed Real of 
the desire underlying its cynicism, camp and the generalised biopolitical 
demand to treat romance, love and sexuality as a trine of quasi-professional 
partnership, a health issue and an athletic activity.16
14
  
This insight entails that the 69 Love Songs perform a kind of social criticism. 
Yet we have to specify both the object and the method or strategy of this 
criticism. To do so, I am now turning for a comparison to a moment in 
modernist social criticism, and specifically the work of the Neo-Realist film 
director Michelangelo Antonioni. Like the dynamic songs, Antonioni’s films, 
as Deleuze argues, 'are inseparable from an objective critique', but, as we 
shall presently see, the former are so in an intrinsically postmodern way.17 
Gilles Deleuze describes Antonioni's 'aesthetic vision' as follows: 
15
  
[W]e are sick with Eros, because Eros is himself objectively sick: what 
has love become that a man or a woman should emerge from it so 
disabled, pitiful and suffering, and act and react as badly at the 
 
 
beginning as at the end, in a corrupt society?18
  
If in Antonioni the distinction between a sick Eros and a 'corrupt society' is 
rigorously maintained, in the dynamic songs the societal corruption is 
already biopolitically integrated in the man or the woman, so that the 
distance between society and individual voice is evanescent, and words, 
speaker and addressee are always already ethically corrupted: 'and who 
said a man was fair'? ('Sweet-Lovin' Man', vol. 1). Betrayal is taken for 
granted: 'When you betray me /betray me with a kiss' ('Come Back from San 
Francisco', vol. 1). Words lie bilaterally: 'You've lied too/but it's a sin that I / 
can't tell the truth' ('I Think I Need a New Heart', vol. 1). If something 
momentarily seems to point to a hope beyond this generalised turpitude and 
vice, this is singing itself: 'all comes out wrong/unless I put it in a song' (I 
Think I Need a New Heart', vol. 1). Yet, songs and music, too, could not ever 
prevent the failure of the amorous relation: 'but I could never make you stay / 
not for all the tea in China /not if I could sing like a bird […] / not if I could 
write for you / the sweetest song you ever heard' ('All My Little Words', vol. 
1). At most, they can have a higher understanding of the lover—as with the 
'acoustic guitar', which seems to 'understand where she's coming from / 
which I obviously don't / or she wouldn't be gone' ('Acoustic Guitar, vol. 3)—
or a cathartic power, albeit not cleansed from vengeance: 'but my 
sentimental melody / like a long-lost lullaby / will ring in your ears / down 
through the years / bringing a tear to your eye' ('My Sentimental Melody', vol. 
1). But, all in all, songs too cannot escape the universal law of dubiousness 
and deception: 'it's all just a song / just beautiful lies' ('My Sentimental 
Melody', vol. 1). 
 
  
If Antonioni's modernist film, L'eclisse (The Eclipse, 1962) pointedly links the 
objective sickness of Eros to the demands of the capitalist economy on the 
characters, the 69 Love Songs shunt any attempt to distinguish between the 
so-called individual and politico-economic realms. Rather, their critical 
practice is governed by the consciousness that an effective postmodern 
political criticism must bypass the traditional distinctions between the various 
discourses on ethics, economics, politics, society and the individual, and 
address all of them as a biopolitical assemblage. Indicative of this approach 
is Merritt's self-representation, whose biopolitical resistance frustrates the 
expectations of and norms imposed on indie-rock and mainstream, alike. For 
instance, despite having grown up in relative poverty, Merritt poses as a 
'spoiled rich kid' and, thumbing his nose at identity politics and political 
correctness, refuses to flaunt homosexuality, to champion hip-hop and even 
to identify with the 'indie-ghetto', generally withdrawing from the privilege of 
representing the subaltern periphery (Merritt in 'As Hundreds Cheer' and 
liner). And, while these are gestures that some would welcome (even if for 
different reasons than Merritt's), people in the USA, unlike the 'English', 
'again and again' feel that 'Merritt hates them', for he also infringes on more 
universalisable postmodern biopolitical injunctions of the USA, including 
16
 
political correctness (the main focus of The New Yorker's Sasha Frere-Jones 
and Chicago Reader's Jessica Hopper), anti-intellectualism, sloppiness of 
expression, idle talk, polite hypocrisy, systematic engagement in social and 
sexual intercourse, cheerfulness and even a higher pitch of voice than he 
actually has.19 In the U.S.A., Merritt's biopolitical rebellion may render him 
an outsider to both 'centre' and 'margin', yet, though the life of the artist is 
inseparable from his work, an ad hominem argument does not suffice. More 
crucial to my argument is the resistance inscribed in the songs. 
  
Of the sixty-nine songs, only 'I Don't Want to Get Over You' (vol. 1) explicitly 
resists current biopolitical trends, with the narrator's refusal to take  'Prozac', 
'listen to my therapist', 'pretend you don't exist', and 'smile all night / at 
somebody new.' The remaining songs often adopt the biopolitical demands 
of postmodernity as, if you wish, 'uncritically' integrated parts of the lover's 
discourse—e.g., 'kiss me, I've quit smoking' ('Come Back From San 
Francisco', vol. 1). Metaphors marrying the lover's discourse with the 
scientific foreground the dominant technologisation and scientification of 
emotions in contemporary biopolitics by replicating its discourse: 'It's making 
me blue / Pantone 292 / Reno Dakota I'm reaching my quota / of tears for 
the year' ('Reno Dakota', vol. 1), or passim in 'Wi' Nae Wee Bairn Ye'll Me 
Beget' and 'Experimental Music Love' (vol. 3), not to mention the 'Epitaph for 
My Heart' (vol. 2): 
17
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Moreover, with its prevalent concatenation of love and suffering, on the one 
hand—'If you don't cry / it isn't love' ('If you Don't Cry', vol. 2)—and 
emotionless sexuality with a joyful nonchalance, on the other—'A Chicken 
With Its Head Cut Off' (vol. 1), 'Let's Pretend We're Bunny Rabbits' (vol. 1), 
'Underwear' (vol. 3)—the album reinforces the dominant biopolitical 
pathologisation, if not incrimination, of romantic notions of love—'It's a crime 
to fall in love / heart and mind and soul in love / It's a crime to fall in love so 
hard / so hard' ('It’s a Crime', vol. 3). Beyond the absence of any distance 
from the discursive tropes of postmodernity, the text of this compilation of 
songs is quintessentially postmodern also in the sense that it covers aspects 
of love and uses vocabulary that in the past would not be represented in a 
love song (eminent examples being 'How Fucking Romantic' and 'Punk 
Love' in vol. 1, or, again, 'Underwear' and 'Yeah! Oh, Yeah!' in vol. 3). And 
last, but not least, these songs are marked by sarcasm. A fortiori, for Merritt 
a song is 'a love song if it's sarcastic', and 'in the context of 69 Love Songs, 
it's automatically sarcastic.' Unlike any other expressive mode, sarcasm 
alone seems to have the prerogative of singing love in postmodernity. 
 
 
  
Sarcasm, however, is the turning point in the 69 Love Songs' Moebius band, 
at which, having followed all along this distinctly postmodern path, we are 
surreptitiously led to the centre of modernism. As Fredric Jameson has 
pointed out, among the symptoms of the cultural shift from modernism to 
postmodernism is the replacement of all forms of parody, whose function is 
by definition ironic and even sarcastic (and hence critical), with what 
Theodor Adorno, in his work on Schoenberg, had called the pastiche. In 
Jameson’s words, in postmodernism, 
18
  
parody finds itself without a vocation […] Pastiche is like parody, the 
imitation of a peculiar or unique, idiosyncratic style, the wearing of a 
linguistic mask, speech in a dead language. But it is a neutral 
pastiche of such mimicry, without any of parody’s ulterior motives, 
amputated of the satiric impulse, devoid of laughter and of any 
conviction that alongside the abnormal tongue you have momentarily 
borrowed, some healthy linguistic normality still exists.20
 
  
To refer to an at once pioneering and quintessential example of postmodern 
pastiche in film production, think of Ridley Scott’s Blade Runner (1982), 
which cites a large array of filmic genres and periods, from hard-boiled film 
noir and Orson Welles to Hong Kong action film and post-futurist science 
fiction, without thereby indicating either that any of these styles is more 
proper than the others or that some other style, not represented in the film, 
would be the proper one. Judging on the album’s wild variety of musical 
styles, referred to above, the 69 Love Songs could also be heard as a 
musical pastiche—except for their irony or sarcasm. For one thing, none of 
these sixty-nine tunes is performed 'straight' or 'seriously.' The Irish folk 
borders on shoegaze, the piano-bar solo songs are decelerated to the point 
of dozing, not unlike the epic show music whose additional minimalism 
leaves only an emaciated skeleton of grandiosity haunt us; or, pushing 
parody to its limits, minimalism is brought to coincide with repetitive, barely 
'musical', excess, as in the 'Experimental Music Love' (vol. 3); plucking the 
fiddle is executed with the virtuosity of plucking a chicken; traditional high-
brow instruments are electronically manipulated to hilarious or pompous 
distortion; solemn voices are accompanied by droll sounds and made to 
sound automated … and the list goes on. (The same, sarcastic, distance is 
also suffused throughout the album by Merritt’s off-key voice.) The musical 
cornucopia of the album combined with the ingenious and irreverent 
simplicity with which each individual song echoes its chosen genre(s) cannot 
fail but advance the thesis that: at this point of history, not a single one of 
these styles is worth replicating, yet, knowing them and being able to 
replicate them by distorting them—that’s the beginning of wisdom. In other 
words, far from engaging in pastiche, the 69 Love Songs execute a laborious 
(at once appreciative and critical) parody of a long musical tradition, to single 
out respectful knowledge and impious defiance in the face of tradition as 
 
 
'some healthy linguistic normality.' 
  
But if this may appear as just an aesthetic point, The Magnetic Fields’ 
(ironic) criticism extends beyond to address and encompass the ethical 
level. If, as Daniel Handler argues, in Merritt's songs 'usually […] the narrator 
is […] sad or mourning the loss of innocence', it is precisely because she or 
he 'is still innocent', still capable of love, even as she lives in and speaks this 
'spoiled' world and language. For if she were not, she would lack the critical 
distance required to experience her own and the world's absence of 
innocence as a loss—non-innocence would be the sole conceivable state of 
being. In spite of the narrators' empirical corruption, their transcendental 
innocent gaze introduces a critical distance between enunciation and 
statement, so that the sarcasm inhering in their 'spoiled' language turns 
against itself. Innocence and love reappropriate postmodern sarcasm 
against its own language and biopolitical rules. Unlike in Neo-Realism, 
where there is a distance between individual and society (language), here 
there is a fissure within the individual, between his statements (language) 
and the position from or gaze under which they are enunciated. 
19
  
The critical strategy of the dynamic songs is a postmodern reappropriation of 
modernist sarcasm, which, by capitalising on love as the exemplary 
discourse through which every aspect of society can be, and is, spoken, 
exercises socio-political criticism directly on the biopolitical level. In the era 
of universalised exchange value and the catholic commodification and 
substitutionability of all objects, including love objects, nothing may be a 
stronger point of socio-political critique than the resistance to allowing 
oneself and others to become exchangeable objects, enabled by an irony 
and even a sarcasm that, through the back door, introduces a gaze of 
uniqueness and irreplaceability. It is possible that in the era of the quasi-
ecumenical commodification of love and sexuality, nothing could have more 
critical power other than the romantic concept of irrevocable love, whose 
encomium is surreptitiously sung by ostensibly cynical lyrics—'only a gun / 
could stop these bitter tears' ('Bitter Tears', vol. 3). In postmodernism, the 
'solution' may indeed shackle together 'love, music, wine and revolution' 
('World Love', vol. 2). 
20
  
However, a caveat is required here due to a certain dominant tendency 
within the tradition of modern Western philosophy. The dynamic songs' 
biopolitical critique is predicated on the conceptual distinction between 
experience and transcendence, but the relation between the two can be 
conceived either in a dualist or in a monist way. The dualist understanding of 
transcendence severs it from empirical experience, as is the case in 
Descartes' division between body and soul, with the latter being immortal.21 
The monist conception of transcendence places the latter within the same 
plane of immanence as empirical life, so that there can be no soul without 
body, as Spinoza argued in his refutation of the soul's immortality.22 This 
21
 
division of Western thought continues to perpetuate itself today, as is evident 
in the distinction between ego-psychology—for which the death drive is 
inconsequential to empirical life which is governed exclusively by the 
pleasure principle—and (Lacanian) psychoanalysis—for which the death 
drive, albeit the transcendental precondition of the pleasure principle, is 
operative within the immanence of empirical life.23 If love is upheld in the 69 
Love Songs as a transcendental function in the dualistic sense, then the 
thrust of their social criticism would be pre-empted, as this love would be 
expelled from the immanence of experience, as inconsequential to empirical 
life. It would be an Ideal incapable of entering reality, whether out of one's 
fear of it (the neurotic approach) or because of one's dismissal of it as 
idealism (the cynical approach)—assuming that there is a real difference 
between the two. 
  
Indeed, at least according to one interpretation, the dynamic antinomy 
shares the dualistic conception of transcendence, as becomes particularly 
evident in Kant’s application of the dynamic antinomy to his political 
philosophy. In his notorious article, 'What is Enlightenment?', Kant argued 
that unconditional obedience should be expected from the 'citizen of civil 
society', while 'freedom' should be reserved only for 'scholars' as 'world 
citizens'. For, in this way, no contradiction arises if the imperative, 'Argue as 
much as you will, and about what you will, but obey!', is addressed to the 
very same subjects, but in different relations—on one side, as 'members of 
the community [who] must passively conduct themselves with an artificial 
unanimity', where 'argument is certainly not allowed—one must obey', and, 
on the other side, 'as a member of the whole community or of a society of 
world citizens', where the scholar 'certainly can argue without hurting the 
affairs for which he is in part responsible as a passive member.'24 Kant's 
conception of enlightened civil society in the fashion of the dynamic 
antinomy precludes any interaction between empirical civil society and 
transcendental universe of world-citizens, rendering the freedom of the latter 
realm inconsequential to the rigidity of the realm of unconditional obedience. 
The formula of this society is: 'everyone is subject to the law, under the 
precondition that only in a different aspect (as a "scholar"), everyone is not 
subject to the law'. The political stakes of this logical hat trick are amply 
evident in Frederic II's jubilant response—'Let them reason all they want to 
as long as they obey.' 25 As Hannah Arendt has put it, political freedom in 
Kant is in the last analysis reserved only for the 'spectator', the scholar 
capable of assuming the 'general standpoint' of 'impartiality', which takes 
'others into account' but knows nothing of 'how to combine with them in order 
to act.'26 Similarly, a dualistic conception of love would reduce it to an object 
of speculation for the 'spectator', the 'scholar' or the listener who would know 
nothing of how to engage with the other in an act of love. 
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To approach the monistic understanding of transcendence, let us return 
once again to the Neo-Spinozist philosopher Deleuze. If we call, with 
23
 
Deleuze, the entirety of time the 'crystal-image' its manifest present aspect 
the 'actual image' and its presupposed past aspect the 'virtual image', then 
the relation between present and past reveals itself as follows: 'The present 
is the actual image, and its contemporaneous past is the virtual image, the 
image in a mirror.'27 In the crystal-image, 'each side', the actual and the 
virtual, takes 'the other's role in a relation which we must describe as 
reciprocal presupposition, or reversibility', whereby the past is the 
transcendental precondition of the present, and vice versa.28 Thus, although 
past and present are 'distinct', they are 'indiscernible', so that 'the actual and 
the virtual […] are in continual exchange.'29 Here, actual and virtual, or 
empirical and transcendental, are 'contemporaneous' and homogeneous, 
that is, of the same ontological status, so that the one can take the place of 
the other, and their roles exchange. This monistic conception of 
transcendence is presupposed so that transcendental love can be realised 
empirically (as well as so that the 69 Love Songs can, as they do, also 
include songs in which the characters revel in the plenitude of their love). 
  
What guarantees the monistic conception of transcendence in the 69 Love 
Songs? For, as long as the dynamic antinomy allows for a dualist reading, 
the dynamic songs cannot in themselves prevent an understanding of 
transcendence as an exception that is required for the constitution of the 
realm of obedience but remains external to it. 
24
  
The Mathematic Songs  
  
The dualistic conception of transcendence in the dynamic antinomy is also 
presupposed in the Lacanian formulation of sexual difference, when read as 
a rearticulation of the Kantian antinomies, as proposed by Joan Copjec.30 
Crucially, 'sex', both in Lacan and here, indicates neither gender difference 
(a cultural construction) nor biological sex (whether a body has female or 
male characteristics), let alone sexual orientation (whether one is 
homosexual, heterosexual, etc.). Rather, sex indicates the failure of culture 
(and, hence, representation, language, or the signifier) to represent the 
human subject in its totality. The human subject is sexed (as opposed to 
simply gendered) precisely because the signifier (reason) fails to represent 
any totality, and hence also the totality of the subject.31
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Kant named the law governing the totality of civil society 'obedience.' In the 
context of sexuality, Lacan calls the law governing the empirical totality of 
the human subject the 'phallic function []', and defines the male totality or 
'man as whole' as the subject who 'acquires his inscription (prend son 
inscription), with the proviso that this function [] is limited due to the 
existence of an x by which the function x is negated (niée)', just as, in 
Kant's dynamic antinomy qua civil society, there is an x (the 'scholar' or 
'world citizen') by which obedience is negated.32 The male sex is the effect 
of reason’s failure in the mode of the dynamic antinomy. 
26
 
  
If there were only one antinomy, the dynamic, there would be only one sex, 
the male. But reason also fails in the mode of the mathematic antinomy. 
Here, Kant's example concerns the limits of the world, regarding which 
reason again offers two contradictory statements: the thesis that 'the world 
has a beginning in time, and is…limited' in 'space'; and the antithesis that 
'the world has no beginning, and no limits.'33 However, these two statements 
do not express truths about the world in itself, insofar as 'space and time, 
together with the appearances in them' are 'nothing existing in themselves 
and outside of my representations.'34 Consequently, 'I cannot say the world 
is infinite […] nor […] that it is finite' because in either case I would speak of 
'my representations' of the world and not of the world in itself.35
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While this antinomy is incapable of producing true judgments about the 
world, its thrust lies in alerting us to the fact that there may be a 'world' in 
itself, a Real, beyond 'my representations.' In dualist fashion, the dynamic 
antinomy treats the thing-in-itself as a transcendent exception (Ideal) 
external to the empirical field (and representation), so that the latter forms a 
closed totality within which everything is unconditionally subjected to the law. 
By contrast, in a monist fashion, the mathematic antinomy allows the thing-
in-itself to pierce representation and force it to raise the question about its 
existence, to which representation cannot respond anything that would 
reduce the thing-in-itself to an external exception. Thus, representation 
cannot form a closed totality, it remains not-whole, due to the thing-in-itself, 
the 'real', which 'resists symbolisation absolutely', without nevertheless being 
external to it.36 The failure of reason in the mode of the mathematic 
antinomy becomes in Lacan the matrix of the female sex which does 'not 
allow for any universality', it remains 'not-whole, insofar as it has the choice 
of positing itself in x or of not being there (de n'en pas être).'37
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It is through the mathematic or female songs that the 69 Love Songs raise 
the question of the existence of the real—the real either is or is not—but 
statements about it are neither true nor false, for these are categories that 
pertain to judgments (representation), not to the real itself. A fortiori, the real 
is what persistently subsists beyond claims about truth and falsity, which is 
why it cannot be deconstructed.38 Put differently, it is out of the failure of 
representation to decide as to the truth or falsity of the limits of a totality that 
the real emerges as an effect of an otherwise ecumenically deconstructive 
representation. 
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Thus, for the female sex, the more the 69 Love Songs deconstruct love on 
the level of representation, the more they reaffirm it on the level of the real. 
This is the effect of the 69 Love Songs' contradictory celebration and 
condemnation of love—an internal contradiction instrumental to the album's 
epistemology, stated at its most explicit in 'The Death of Ferdinand de 
Saussure' (vol. 3): 
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I met Ferdinand de Saussure 
on a night like this 
On love he said 'I'm not so sure 
I even know what it is 
No understanding, no closure 
It is a nemesis 
You can't use a bulldozer 
to study orchids' 
 
  
You can't use words to study love, is the lesson of the 'father' of structural 
linguistics for The Magnetic Fields—yet it is only through this failure of the 
words that love triumphs on the level of the real, as the song continues to 
state: 'I do not know anything about love', yet 'I am nothing without love.' The 
mathematic songs concur with Roland Barthes: 'What do I think of love?—As 
a matter of fact, I think nothing of love. I'd be glad to know what it is, but 
being inside, I see it in existence, not in essence.'39
 
  
The mathematic songs, therefore, reveal the insurmountable gap between 
representation or appearances and the real—a fissure, which as we shall 
presently see, is necessary for the experience of love—but also the 
difference between desire—an affair exclusively of appearances or 
semblances—and love—something that emerges in the chasm between 
appearance and the real. If, on the one hand, as Hegel already indicated, 
and as Alexandre Kojève made explicit, '[d]esire is […] "humanizing," or 
"anthropogenetic"’, love, on the other hand, is for the living mammal we call 
anthropos that which, in Lacan’s words, 'humanizes jouissance [enjoyment]', 
the latter being the subject’s affair with the real, that is, an impossible, and 
unbearable, relation.40 Expounding Lacan’s statement that only 'l’amour-
sublimation permet à la jouissance de condescendre au désir [love-
sublimation allows jouissance to condescend to desire]',41 Alenka Zupančič 
writes 'the other that is accessible to desire is always the imaginary other', 
the appearance or semblance of the other, 'whereas the Real (Other) of 
desire remains unattainable', for: 
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The Real of desire is jouissance—that 'inhuman partner' (as Lacan 
calls it) that desire aims at beyond its object, and that must remain 
inaccessible. Love, on the other hand, is what somehow manages to 
make the Real of desire accessible. This is what Lacan is aiming at 
with his statement that love 'humanizes jouissance.'42
 
  
If desire is too wrapped up in appearances to relate to the real of the other, 
to the other as a real human being rather than one’s own imaginary 
construction, and if jouissance is too 'inhuman' to treat the other as human, 
as opposed to some inaccessible sublime object (Ideal), love is what allows 
jouissance to condescend to desire, to 'make it possible for the Real to 
 
 
condescend to the appearance (in the form of a split in the very core of 
appearance)', whereby the Real does not turn out 'to be just another 
appearance' but rather 'it is real precisely as appearance.'43 It is only by 
revealing the split between the inaccessible Real and appearance that the 
mathematic antinomy provides access to love as the transgression of their 
(apparent) opposition, thereby allowing us to experience the other as an 
accessible and all-too-human ideal. 
  
Aesthetic Anorexia  
  
As the above line of thought indicates, the question of sex, just as the 
question of the reality or not of love, cannot be answered within and in terms 
of socio-cultural constructivism, as it pertains to the latter’s failure, which is 
also to say its excess—'excess' being for Merritt the album’s only theme 
beyond love. The mathematic songs point to excess most eloquently when 
approaching love not as a particular life experience but explicitly as a 
universal object that, as such, can be articulated around a universalising 
simile or metaphor, as in 'The Book Of Love' (vol. 1) and 'Love Is Like A 
Bottle of Gin' (vol. 3). Nobody cares to read the age-old, 'long and boring' 
book of love, and, nevertheless, 'I love it when you read to me / and…you 
can read me anything.' Although the enamoured subject can be described 
through metaphors properly pertaining to inebriation, the central simile is not 
reversible, with love's excess spilling over it: 'Love is like a bottle of gin / but 
a bottle of gin is not like love.' 
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In 'Meaningless' (vol. 3)—the most explicit mathematic song, an exuberant 
glorification of love qua real, beyond any possible representation or 
meaning—'everything' pertaining to love is 'meaningless'; in fact, 'even less / 
a little glimpse of nothingness.' The final fadeout, with its tireless sliding of 
adverbs, is a conceptual crescendo reaffirming the subsistence of the real as 
the register underlying all human experience, from the basic biological need 
of nutrition to transcendence: 
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Nutrition 'deliciously meaningless' 
Sensation 'effervescently meaningless' 
Aesthetics 'beautifully meaningless' 
Reason/Extension 'profoundly meaningless' 
Finality 'definitively meaningless' 
Reason/Totality 'comprehensively meaningless' 
Sublimity 'magnificently meaningless' 
Credulity 'incredibly meaningless' 
History 'unprecedentedly meaningless' 
Excitation 'Mind-blowingly meaningless' 
Faith 'unbelievably meaningless' 
Transcendence 'infinitely meaningless'  
 
  
 
Although the adverbial syntagma, as Handler says, 'could have gone on […] 
forever', it is no accident that it starts with nutrition and ends with a literally 
excessive transcendence (insofar as the song fades out without ever 
pronouncing it), particularly as this choice was not made consciously. 
Merritt's intention was 'to make 26 lines and have them alphabetical', as was 
actually the plan regarding all the songs of the album, which were 'originally' 
intended 'to be sequenced alphabetically.' But Merritt 'abandoned that idea' 
because 'it didn't work', just as he had to abandon the idea of the 26 lines in 
the fadeout of 'Meaningless', mostly because of the difficulties the letter 'K' 
posed in finding an adverb. So, neither the compilation of the songs in the 
actual album nor the list of adverbs in this fadeout is the product of a plan. 
Merritt provides no explanation of either the one or the other; they just 
happened. 
 
  
And yet, the link between nutrition and transcendence is both contingent and 
necessary, which is also to say, real. If love is said to amount to 'even less / 
a little glimpse of nothingness', it is because 'the nothing' is what the 
anorectic eats.44 For, 'at the oral level, ' the real 'from which the 
subject…has separated itself off', in 'order to constitute itself' as a conscious 
(i.e., representable) self, 'is the nothing, in so far as that from which the 
subject was weaned', be it the breast or the bottle, 'is no longer anything for 
him', since he can now eat by other means. Anorexia nervosa is the 
symptom of the fact that the subject's 'lack'—the real of the subject's 
desire—is nothing other than 'the nothing' itself, that is, that 'the nothing' or 
'the real' is a positive function rather than just nothing.45 Just as the 
anorectic gives us a glimpse of the nothingness of lack, the lover gives us a 
glimpse of the nothingness of love, and both point to the nothingness of the 
real. 
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The epistemological and rhetorical strategies of the 69 Love Songs, which 
elevate love to the level of the real via the defiles of monistic transcendence, 
meaninglessness and nothingness, replicate the logic of anorexia on a 
metaphorical level, in what could be called a practice of aesthetic anorexia. 
Once one grasps the logic of aesthetic anorexia, the meaning of individual 
mathematic songs, as was the case with 'Meaningless', is transformed and 
made to point directly to the overall effect of the 69 Love Songs' aesthetic 
mechanism. For instance, 'Nothing Matters When We're Dancing' (vol. 1), 
does not simply point to the ambiguity that 'both nothing else matters when 
we're dancing' and 'nothing matters at all when we're dancing', but now 
makes the two sides of this double entendre, 'nothing else' and 'nothing at 
all', converge so as to reveal love as the sole thing that matters when we're 
dancing.46 Love, as a monistic transcendence inseparable from experience, 
cannot but infect and undermine the latter’s categories, time and space, so 
that they somehow vanish, and it eventually does not matter whether we are 
dancing in 'Paris or in Lansing' to the sound of 'dreadful tunes' and 'awful 
songs', for 'we don't even hear.' This is the effect of aesthetic anorexia, 
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because of which we are not idealistically ecstatic, but extimate: at once 
within and without experience: even though we don't hear the songs, we 
know they are awful.47
  
Extimacy, as the relation between love and experience, is reenacted in the 
relation between the music and lyrics of the 69 Love Songs. Each song 
musically represents a particular soundscape or combination of discernible 
soundscapes, connected to a specific musical genre, history and place. And 
yet, whether the listener happens to be boy or girl, the totality of these 
soundscapes in the album produces for each a univocal statement about 
love—which is not to say that oscillation between  the two alternative 
positions is excluded; for one thing, oscillation between two positions 
presupposes two distinct positions in the first place; for another, as Freud 
argued, unconsciously we are all bisexual.48
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Recapitulating, while the dynamic songs could allow for a division of the 
universe into the realms of experience and transcendence, thereby posing 
love as the transcendental precondition of the empirical amorous affair, the 
mathematic songs guarantee that this transcendental precondition be not 
reduced to an exception to empirical life, an Ideal, but be instead posed on 
the level of the real—something which, albeit unrepresentable, is the core 
circumscribed by all empirical life and representation. The term aesthetic 
anorexia designates that artistic approach that circumscribes the real as the 
unrepresentable nothing. 
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Consisting of two sets of songs, the dynamic and the mathematic, the 69 
Love Songs is an album that is itself sexed—which is why, to respond to our 
initial question, for some listeners, the overall point of the album may be that 
love is (real), and for others that it is not, that it is an impossible, perhaps 
overrated, Ideal which, as such, we might as well discard. 
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It follows that, in more general terms, sex determines what appears real and 
what illusory, or, as Lacan puts it, sex is 'a matter of the constitution of the 
subject’s reality', a process that takes place by 'testing the external by the 
internal.'49 It is 'the judgment of existence, which consists in saying—This is 
not my dream or my hallucination or my representation but an object.'50
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In other words, boys and girls, if your sex happens to be other than what you 
expected, or changes each time you contemplate the album as a whole, this 
does not indicate any confusion in your gender identity or sexual orientation. 
If sex has any relation to whether you identify yourself as 'female', 'male', 
'transsexual', 'boyfriendable' or ‘girlfriendable’, etc., this is only insofar as 
your sex allows you to see that specific type(s) of sexual orientation and 
practice as real, and hence, also the potential locus of love, be it an ideal or 
real. 
40
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